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Arbitration: Trial by Other Means or
Settlement by Other Means?
By JOSHUA P. DAvIs*
OVER A CENTURY ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote, "The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pre-
tentious, are what I mean by the law."' This definition offered a re-
freshing realism. It directed those who sought the law to turn away
from the abstract legal principles found in dusty books and toward the
actual decisions of judges in courts.
Scholars in the past have criticized Holmes's definition of the law
as too cynical, as improperly conflating the requirements of the law
with the limited ability of courts to enforce those requirements.2 To-
day, however, one might take just the opposite view-that Holmes's
aphorism is quaintly idealistic, that his focus on the courts is no longer
realistic enough. After all, more and more cases are subject to pre-
dispute arbitration clauses. These clauses allow either party to a dis-
pute to elect to resolve it through arbitration rather than trial. Courts
have a strong tendency to enforce the clauses, and then to subject the
outcome of arbitration to a very deferential review. This is true even
when the legal rights at issue cannot be waived by agreement of the
parties. 3 As a result, courts may pronounce one legal standard, while
arbitrators apply another. If Holmes were writing today, he might
claim more appropriately, "The prophecies of what arbitrators will do
in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."
But is that right? Is the increasing use of arbitration transforming
the law? Or is the outcome of arbitration not law at all, but rather an
extension of the right of parties to resolve a dispute between them as
* Associate Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. I am grateful for
the very helpful comments of Jay Folberg and Michelle Travis on a draft of this Essay.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
2. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 20-24 (1988);
Joshua P. Davis, Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Revising Injunction Doctrine, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 363,
405-10 (2003).
3. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703 (1999) (arguing that courts allow parties and
arbitrators to create new legal standards through arbitration).
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they wish? Is it no more the law than the terms of any settlement
agreement?
I ask these questions because they point out a fundamental tenm-
sion that runs through both the growing body of scholarship on arbi-
tration and the fine essays in this symposium issue of the Law Review.
Resolving that tension is essential to reach a satisfactory view on the
various issues that arise in regard to arbitration and arbitration
clauses. For that reason, it is worthwhile to explore the point a bit
further. Whether the outcomes of arbitrations are in some sense law is
just one among many related issues. More generally, one might ask
whether arbitration is trial by other means, settlement by other means,
or some combination of the two.
Opponents of pre-dispute arbitration clauses tend to view arbitra-
tion as similar to trial in a crucial sense: their view is that arbitration,
like trial, should resolve disputes according to rules that promote jus-
tice. From this perspective, terms accepted by the parties should not
completely control the structure of arbitration, just as they do not
completely control court proceedings. The effect of agreements be-
tween parties on the shape of the dispute resolution process should be
limited. This position finds support, among other places, in the pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court that arbitration changes only the
process of adjudication, not underlying substantive rights. 4 Along this
line of reasoning, to ensure parties' substantive rights remain intact,
perhaps arbitration should have to follow some of the procedures of
trial.5
The difficulty with this view, however, is that the point of arbitra-
tion is to provide an attractive alternative to trial, not to replicate it.
Arbitration may allow only limited discovery, permit consideration of
evidence that would be inadmissible at trial, produce an outcome
without any explanation of its rationale, or prevent any meaningful
opportunity for appeal. For many people it is a virtue that arbitration
usually discards many of the formalities of trial and provides a final
result. These characteristics can reduce the time and money necessary
to resolve a dispute. The strong federal policy behind enforcing arbi-
4. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001); Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
5. See Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1997) (arguing that due process concerns should apply
to arbitrations).
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tration agreements is in part to allow parties to deviate from trial in
just these ways.
One may be tempted, then, to say that arbitration is really more
like settlement than trial. This is the view that proponents of pre-dis-
pute arbitration clauses tend to adopt. In a sense, they view arbitration
as settlement by other means: it allows parties to control how they will
resolve their disputes.
But parties do not have an unlimited ability to settle claims, at
least not those that have yet to arise. There are various substantive
legal rights that are not susceptible to waiver in advance. These in-
clude certain rights under federal employment laws,6 consumer pro-
tection laws, and landlord-tenant laws,7 to name but a few examples.
The courts appear to have concluded that these rights are subject to
pre-dispute arbitration clauses.8 But if certain substantive rights that
cannot be waived can be the subject of mandatory arbitration, then
perhaps there should be restrictions on when arbitration agreements
should be enforced or on the form that arbitration may assume. Such
restrictions would ensure that plaintiffs do not waive rights indirectly
that they cannot waive directly.9
Attention to these competing models helps to situate each of the
contributions to this law review symposium. Consider, for example,
the enlightening exchange between Professors Jean Sternlight and
Stephen Ware. The issue they address is the relationship between pre-
dispute arbitration clauses and the right to trial by jury. Of particular
interest is their discussion of how this issue plays out in state court.
Professor Sternlight notes that many states will enforce a waiver of the
right to trial by jury only if it is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
This standard, she explains, is higher than courts have generally ap-
6. See David Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbi-
trability, and Res Judicata, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 49, 63 (2003) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 35, 51 (1974)).
7. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 195, 207-10 (1998) (not-
ing mandatory rules in court, including strict products liability, the warranty of habitability,
usury laws, and certain restrictions on insurance and employment contracts).
8. See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, No. 00-57222, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 20007, at *29-33 (9th
Cir. Sept. 30, 2003); Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir.
1999).
9. It is perhaps no coincidence that Keith Hylton's defense of enforcement of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses is, in essence, an argument in favor of allowing parties to waive
rights, which could include those that are currently inalienable. See Keith N. Hylton, Agree-
ments to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 209
(2000).
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plied to enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Relying on
state contract law, courts will, for example, enforce such clauses in
adhesion contracts against parties who were unaware of their
existence.
Professor Sternlight contends that a heightened standard for con-
sent should apply to enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
regard to claims that entail the right to a jury trial. She makes the
argument that the jury plays a special and important role at trial, that
it is significant not only for disputants but also for the working of our
political system, that arbitration deprives parties of a jury and, as a
result, that pre-dispute arbitration clauses should be subject to the
same scrutiny as any similar waiver of the right to trial by jury.
Professor Ware's essay does not address directly which standard
should govern whether to enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ment, although he has argued elsewhere that ordinary contract law
should apply.' 0 However, he does question whether pre-dispute arbi-
tration clauses should be called "mandatory," as Professor Sternlight
labels them. After all, as he points out, it is the refusal to enforce pre-
dispute arbitration clauses that would result in a mandatory rule, for it
defies the contractual agreement of the parties. In contrast, the deci-
sion to enter into a contract, even a contract of adhesion, is voluntary.
Further, he states that he is generally (although not always?) against
mandatory rules. Taken together, these two points support the posi-
tion that in state court, just as Professor Ware has argued regarding
federal court, the ordinary contract standard should apply to enforce-
ment of pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
The choice between these positions may depend on whether we
view arbitration as similar to trial or settlement. Professor Sternlight's
argument is strongest if we think of arbitration as largely akin to trial.
If that analogy governs, then waiver of the right to trial by jury
through arbitration should be afforded the same protection as waiver
of that right at trial. in both cases, the need for procedural fairness
may require special protection. In contrast, Professor Ware's view is
attractive if we accept the premise that arbitration is like settlement
and that paramount above fair procedures is the need to honor the
10. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses and Other Contractual
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Winter/Spring
2004).
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decisions of the parties. Proceeding from this premise, the position
that the ordinary contract standard should apply seems unassailable.'I
A similar contrast applies to the analyses of Professors Sternlight
and Ware of the extent to which the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 12
preempts state law regarding waiver of the right to trial by jury. In
other words, if we assume Professor Sternlight is right that a height-
ened consent standard applies to pre-dispute arbitration clauses for
claims that entail a right to trial by jury, does the FAA preempt this
aspect of state law?
Professor Sternlight's view, to oversimplify a bit, is that state laws
are preempted only if they single out arbitration agreements for inval-
idation. The special protections afforded the right to trial by jury ap-
ply generally to certain claims, not just to waiver through an
agreement to arbitrate. As a result, she concludes, they are not
preempted.
Professor Ware harbors some doubts about this conclusion. The
precise language of the FAA requires state (and federal) courts to en-
force arbitration agreements "save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' 3 As Professor Ware
notes, the right to trial by jury does not affect any contract, as speci-
fied in the FAA, but only the agreement to arbitrate certain claims.' 4
A strong argument can be made, he reasons, that the FAA therefore
preempts state laws that require a heightened standard for consent to
arbitration.
This dispute over preemption can be resolved in several ways.
One may, for example, parse the language of the FAA itself or of Su-
preme Court precedent interpreting the statute. But the ultimate is-
sue, I believe, is how we should view the mandate of the FAA. Does it
force states to treat arbitration as a particularly strong form of settle-
ment, so that parties may opt for arbitration even if by doing so they
11. Alternatively, Ware's position can be defended by acknowledging that pre-dispute
arbitration clauses should receive the same review as other waivers to the right to trial by
jury and by arguing nevertheless that ordinary contract law should apply. Professor Ware
takes this approach in Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of
Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Winter/Spring 2004), where
he assumes for the sake of argument that the ordinary standard for waiver of the right to
trial by jury would apply to pre-dispute arbitration clauses. He contends that ordinary con-
tract law should apply in general.
12. United States Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925)
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2003)).
13. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
14. Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State Constitu-
tionalJury-7rial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 39, 45 (2003).
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compromise rights that they could not waive in advance of a dispute?
Or does the FAA allow states to incorporate into arbitration some of
the rights that apply to trial? And if the states can create safeguards
that apply not only to trial, but also to arbitration, where should we
draw the line? Could the states require, for example, use of arbitrators
employed by the state, just as judges are employed by the state? A
satisfying resolution of this issue requires a coherent model of arbitra-
tion, one that explains the ways in which arbitration resembles trial
and the ways in which it resembles settlement.
The same tension lurks behind Professor David Schwartz's discus-
sion of remedy-stripping provisions in arbitration clauses. As he notes,
defendants have begun to argue that the strong federal policy in favor
of arbitration applies to all provisions in arbitration clauses, including
those that limit the remedies available to plaintiffs. The FAA, defend-
ants seem to reason, provides a general empowerment to parties to
make all sorts of choices, including, in effect, to waive rights that
could not be waived otherwise. This argument is often phrased as a
demand that courts enforce arbitration clauses "as written."1 5
Professor Schwartz notes that courts have rejected defendants' ef-
forts to strip plaintiffs of remedies through arbitration provisions in
contracts of adhesion. He argues that provisions in arbitration clauses
that indirectly achieve remedy-stripping also should not be honored,
including those that reduce the statue of limitations or prohibit partic-
ipation in class actions. These clauses do not expressly deprive plain-
tiffs of remedies, but they may have that effect. He then offers a
careful analysis of how the unenforceable provisions should be
treated, including the implications for purposes of res judicata when
some, but not all, of the claims available to a plaintiff are resolved
through arbitration. The general theme to his argument is that de-
fendants overreach when they seek to use the policy in favor of arbi-
tration to strip plaintiffs of their remedies, and that the courts should
therefore interpret arbitration agreements and apply resjudicata in a
way that least rewards the defendants who draft these clauses.
Professor Schwartz's essay is thoughtful and enlightening. Still, it
leaves room for yet another step in the analysis. I submit that the com-
peting views on remedy-stripping provisions differ on much the same
grounds as do Professors Sternlight and Ware. In general, whether
15. See Schwartz, supra note 6 at 78 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct.
2402 (2003); West Virginia ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 279-80 (W. Va. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1087 (2002); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393,
408 (Ct. App. 2003)).
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such provisions should be enforced "as written" or whether they
should be subject to the restrictions that would apply in court de-
pends on whether arbitration is trial by other means or an especially
powerful form of settlement by other means.
The same choice is relevant to the details of Professor Schwartz's
analysis. Consider, for example, his argument that courts should not
enforce provisions of arbitration clauses that shorten statutes of limita-
tion or that prohibit class actions because, in practice, they deprive
many plaintiffs of a remedy. His logic is persuasive on its own terms.
The problem, however, is that arbitration by its nature has this effect.
Limited discovery and the absence of any meaningful appeal, for ex-
ample, mean that some plaintiffs will lose claims in arbitration that
they would win in court. The difficult issue, then, is to come up with a
principled way to distinguish those variations from trial that are per-
missible in arbitration and those that are not. In sum, to what extent
should the dispute resolution process be within the control of the par-
ties? This is the question that Professor Schwartz's analysis suggests.
The same tension is found in Professor Ruth Glick's engaging
discussion of the development of the ethics rules for arbitrators in
California, including the new stringent requirements regarding po-
tential conflicts-of-interest and disclosure. Among the concerns that
give rise to these rules is that repeat players may have an advantage in
arbitration. In particular, arbitrators may have incentive to please the
large corporations that draft arbitration clauses in contracts of adhe-
sion and that therefore have control over the selection of providers of
dispute resolution services.
Professor Glick questions whether California's ethical rules go
too far and whether arbitrators are being placed under excessive scru-
tiny. The real problem, she suggests, is that courts are too willing to
enforce pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
As she recognizes, however, federal preemption limits the ability
of states to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements. And if defend-
ants can require arbitration, even of rights that plaintiffs cannot waive,
then perhaps arbitration should include many of the procedural pro-
tections of court. Judges do not profit financially by attracting busi-
ness. Their insulation from these sorts of concerns contributes to their
impartiality. If plaintiffs have little meaningful ability to avoid arbitra-
tion in many contexts, and little control over the selection among pro-
vider organizations, then the rules governing the ethics for arbitrators
might best be designed to make them similar to judges. The more
arbitration looks like trial-a default option that a party has little
Fall 2003]
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power to reject-the stronger the justification for imposing the same
safeguards that govern the judiciary. These safeguards include strict
disclosure requirements and protections against conflict of interest.
Finally, attention to the competing models also reveals the excep-
tional nature of Lewis Maltby's article. His approach is unusual in part
because it is empirical. He discusses the evidence in assessing the rela-
tive results of trial and arbitration in employment cases. At least as
important is that he, unlike most proponents of arbitration clauses,
embraces the analogy of arbitration to trial. It is not enough for him
that parties "choose" arbitration. His view is that arbitration poses a
problem if it produces a lesser form of justice than trial. But he ques-
tions that it does.
After careful analysis of his own and other empirical work, Maltby
arrives at important and provocative conclusions. First, the rates of
success of plaintiffs in arbitration and in those cases that reach trial
are comparable, at least for employment disputes resolved by reputa-
ble providers of arbitration services, like the American Arbitration Ser-
vices. Second, in these disputes, taking into account the possibility of
summary judgment, plaintiffs tend to succeed at a significantly higher
rate in arbitration than at trial. Third, in comparable employment
cases, the median award is about the same for trial and arbitration,
although trial tends to produce higher mean awards and larger
awards in exceptional cases than does arbitration. Fourth, employees
are able to secure counsel to pursue some cases in arbitration that
attorneys would not be willing to take if the alternative to settlement
were trial. Together these points make a strong case for reconsidering
the position that arbitration provides employees second class justice.
Indeed, the case for this view may be even stronger than the one
that Maltby methodically lays out. For example, it is striking that arbi-
tration allows employees to pursue smaller claims than does trial, and
yet the median result of arbitration is about the same as the median
result at trial. This suggests that for the typical employment claim, the
result in arbitration may actually be better than the result at trial.
However, Maltby's work, like most good empirical analysis, sug-
gests as many questions as it answers. What if, for example, he is right
that arbitration produces more consistent results than trial, but does
not yield the largest outcomes that sometimes occur at trial? Arbitra-
tion, then, may sacrifice the largest recoveries to provide redress to a
broader group of people. We need a standard for justice in dispute
resolution to determine whether we think this is good, bad, or
indifferent.
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Another interesting problem relates to the effect of trial and arbi-
tration on settlement, the most common form of dispute resolution.
The threat of large damages may induce some defendants to offer
larger settlements when the alternative is trial rather than arbitration,
at least for those defendants who are averse to risk. On the other
hand, employees who are averse to risk may be. more aggressive in
settlement negotiations in anticipation of arbitration than in anticipa-
tion of trial, if they feel that arbitration offers them a higher likeli-
hood of prevailing. How these competing considerations play out in
practice is crucial.
In addition, there are some less savory possibilities that may be
consistent with Maltby's analysis. In particular, Maltby seems to as-
sume that the cases on average are about as strong in trial and arbitra-
tion. 16 This assumption is necessary, for example, to use the relative
success rates in arbitration and trial as a measure of the relative justice
they produce. However, it is possible, if speculative, that arbitration
does favor employers and that employers who enter pre-dispute arbi-
tration clauses have a tendency to violate employees' rights. In other
words, the choice to enter pre-dispute arbitration agreements and the
effect of those agreements may be related to the lawfulness or lawless-
ness of employer behavior. Employers who draft pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clauses may be bad actors, arbitration may limit their liability, and
the success rate in arbitration may reflect that their employees have
stronger claims than many employees who seek relief through trial.
Moreover, pre-dispute arbitration agreements may be part of their
overall effort to eliminate certain kinds of claims, including by prohib-
iting class actions, which may provide the only means for legal redress
for the very smallest of claims. Admittedly, these are just possibilities. 17
But some confirmation is necessary that the claims that go to arbitra-
16. For a critique of this assumption, see Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empiri-
cal and Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. ON DIsp.
RESOL. 735, 755-758 (2001).
17. Note, however, that Keith Hylton's argument, and the theory of law and econom-
ics, suggest that employers might choose to enter pre-dispute arbitration clauses or other
agreements that limit employees' rights as an alternative to incurring the expense of com-
plying with the law. See generally Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal
Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 209 (2000). From an economic perspec-
tive, these agreements may be efficient. Employees may be compensated in other ways for
ceding substantive rights, even those rights that courts have held are inalienable. As noted
in the text, Maltby does not rely on (and rejects) this justification of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses. See Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REv.
105 (2003).
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tion and the claims that go to trial are comparable before we accept
Maltby's flattering assessment of arbitration.' 8
Maltby's analysis is significant on its own terms. It also has
broader implications. In particular, it reveals that a complete assess-
ment of arbitration requires not only identifying the ways in which it
should be treated similarly to trial and the ways in which it should be
treated similarly to settlement. We also need greater clarity as to what
justice at trial and in settlement entails. 19 That is the only way to deter-
mine our view of arbitration if, for example, we become convinced
that arbitration improves the odds that a plaintiff will win but de-
creases her largest possible recovery, or if it enhances the prospects of
some plaintiffs and harms the prospects of others in settlement
negotiations.
None of this is to say that the essays in this symposium issue of the
Law Review fail to provide valuable insights and important conclu-
sions. The opposite is true. They have made real contributions to un-
derstanding arbitration and pre-dispute arbitration clauses. My point
is that the whole of this symposium issue is greater than the sum of its
parts. Together the essays point out the need for-and help us to
work toward-a coherent theory of how arbitration is similar to trial,
how it is similar to settlement, and what justice requires in each set-
ting. To reach closure on the issues in this timely symposium issue, I
believe we need to have that theory in place.
18. It is notable that all of these questions and concerns may apply to another area of
dispute resolution that Maltby has not studied: consumer claims. This, too, is a topic on
which empirical work would be invaluable.
19. I have made some efforts along these lines. See, e.g., Joshua P. Davis, Toward a
Jurisprudence of Trial and Settlement: Allocating Attorney's Fees by Amending Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68, 48 ALA. L. REv. 65 (1996); Joshua P. Davis, Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Revising
Injunction Doctrine, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 363, 428-60 (2003); Joshua P. Davis, Expected Value Arbi-
tration, 57 OKLA. L. REv. (forthcoming Spring 2004).
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